AN OVERVIEW ON THE MIDEAST SITUATION

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AN OVERVIEW ON THE MIDEAST SITUATION

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, and Tsongas.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Shultz, we once again warmly welcome you before this committee to discuss recent Middle Eastern developments, including the President's peace initiative and the progress that has been made in resolving the Lebanese situation.

In the few months that Secretary Shultz hase been Secretary, he has conferred and consulted with this committee on a number of occasions. We greatly appreciate our close working relationship, and believe this cooperation is essential in developing a bipartisan American foreign policy. I think we have made great strides in that direction already under your leadership, and we very much appreciate that.

The last time the Secretary appeared before the committee he was looking for our views on the policy the administration should pursue in the Middle East. Since then, President Reagan has articulated in the September 1 speech his Middle East peace proposals. He described his approach as a fresh start, but also followed the broad guidelines laid down by his predecessors.

The President's decision to address this issue at this time has received widespread support here and in much of the world. I can state that those Americans with whom I have discussed this, and particularly from the State of Illinois, have had great enthusiasm for it. There is tremendous enthusiasm in Europe, tremendous enthusiasm in those parts of the Middle East that I was in recently, and certainly tremendous hope as a result of this creative, bold, imaginative initiative that the President has taken together with you, Secretary Shultz.

The Israeli Government regretfully has to date rejected the proposal. Earlier this week, the Knesset voted to support their Government's rejection of President Reagan's proposal and announced plans to establish more settlements in the West Bank and in Gaza.

Despite the Israeli Government's rejection of the proposal, the opposition, including the Labour Alignment, has said that there is much merit in the President's approach.

The Arabs have responded to the U.S. proposal by offering their own views.

Members of the committee are most anxious to hear the Secretary's views on how the peace process will develop over the next several

months. We would also like to discuss developments in Lebanon. Few observers would have believed possible the peaceful, systematic withdrawal of the PLO and Syrian combatants from Beirut. President-elect Bashir Gemayel, however, faces serious problems, including the withdrawal of foreign forces from the remainder of Lebanon, uniting Lebanese Muslims and Christians and forging shattered national institutions. President-elect Gemayel told me just a week or so ago how much the Lebanese people appreciate what the United States has done for Lebanon, and to what extent they depend on us to help them with their other problems.

We look forward to hearing the administration's plans for continuing our assistance to Lebanon. Mr. Secretary, on behalf of this committee, and I know I speak for every member of the committee and every Member of the Senate and, I think, the Congress, we certainly commend the work that you have done, the work that Phil Habib has done under the direction of the President and yourself.

I spent a day with Phil Habib last week, and watched him operate in Beirut. I have known him, as we both have, for many decades. To see him in command, working day by day with the Ambassadors from Spain, France, Italy, and with the commanders of the task forces, and with our own forces, was a remarkable thing. I think we should also say that although the French and the Italians saw fit to choose absolutely crack troops, and they were outstanding, our own commanders took great pride in the fact that the 800 American forces that were there, and I met many of them, were taken right off the line. They were right on duty. They were the readiness forces that were in place, and they were absolutely superb. They stood up with the very best. So, I think we can be extraordinarily proud of the readiness force that the United States has.

Secretary SHULTZ. After all, they were Marines. What do you expect?

Senator GLENN. I am glad you said that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I did take my naval gunnery training at Quantico.

Senator GLENN. That Navy also serves.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we get into intramural activities here, Mr. Secretary, I would like Senator Pell to have an opportunity to comment.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I join enthusiastically our chairman in welcoming you here. I congratulate the administration for its success in facilitating the removal of the PLO forces in West Beirut. Through the skilfull diplomacy of Phil Habib, one of our best career diplomats, a negotiated settlement of the PLO problem in West Beirut was achieved, thus avoiding the all-out Israeli assault that I think worried us and everybody else concerned.

Phil Habib, to my mind, is the master of that old diplomatic technique of always letting the other person have his, Phil's, way. He has developed that to a fine degree. With the removal of the PLO from West Beirut and Southern Lebanon, Israel's northern frontier is now secure, and there is a very real prospect that Lebanon can be constituted or reconstituted as a united, sovereign nation.

That will require, though, the removal of the remaining PLO—and we should remember that there are almost as many PLO guer-

rillas still there as were taken out of Beirut—as well as Syrian and Israeli forces. I hope this can be accomplished quickly without further military action.

I was in Lebanon, Israel and Jordan just prior to the Israeli invasion, and I came away convinced that if Israel is ever to enjoy real peace, everything must be done to resolve soon the question of the status of the occupied West Bank and Gaza. That is why I was very pleased that President Reagan took the initiative last week to make a proposal to advance the peace process.

For the most part, I am sympathetic to the President's proposal. In particular, I favor the idea of a moratorium on settlements. Our former colleague, Senator Javits, made such a proposal several months ago, and I can think of no better way to encourage the Palestinians and the various Arab governments to come to the bargaining table than for Israel to announce that there will be a moratorium on settlements.

Many aspects of the President's proposal have yet to be spelled out in detail. I will, therefore, reserve a final judgment on the entire package until all of its component parts are clearly explained. It is, however, clearly in the American national interest to do everything we can to break the logjam. The President made a valiant effort to do this, and I congratulate him and you and your colleagues for what you are trying to accomplish, and I wish you success.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we would be happy to have a statement from you, and perhaps you would like to introduce your colleagues with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. NICHOLAS VELIOTES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, AND AMBASSADOR RICHARD FAIRBANKS

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that invitation, because you mentioned very kindly Phil Habib's efforts in the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, and Phil is the first to point out that it was very much of a team effort, the team in the State Department dominated by Foreign Service officers, but including others such as Ambassador Fairbanks, working with the President in making that go, and as the President said in awarding the Medal of Freedom, and as Phil pointed out, it is a tribute to the quality of work done by the Foreign Service, as well as by Phil himself.

I am pleased to have with me Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary, and Ambassador Richard Fairbanks, both of whom have been very strong members of the team working on this and the Lebanese operation, and will continue to be playing an instrumental role in developments here as they unfold.

I am also pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned the consultative sessions that we had together and prior to the President's announcement, and I think you could all see some of the track of those consultations in what the President decided to do. It was a bipartisan consultation, and there has been bipartisan support for the President's program, and I think that is, as you pointed out, an essential ingredient.

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the administration's recent policy steps in the Middle East. We have begun actions over a wide range and of immense importance. The positive bipartisan support for President Reagan's peace initiative has been evident to us and is deeply appreciated. That support is essential to the conduct of a vigorous and creative foreign policy, and accordingly I deeply appreciate your willingness to meet with me on short notice.

A little over 2 months ago I came before you as a nominee for Secretary of State. In those hearings we were all clearly concerned about the problems presented by the Middle East and the Palestinian issues in particular. I emphasized then our efforts to secure a cease-fire in Lebanon as a first step toward our goal of a united, sovereign Lebanon freed from foreign forces. I also emphasized the importance of Israeli security and overall peace, while recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and their just requirements.

Since then, not just your attention, but the world's attention, was focused on the Middle East, and particularly on our diplomatic efforts there to end the bloodshed and to bring a deep and lasting peace to the area. With the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, we have turned to the next steps necessary for peace, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the restoration of central authority in that country, and of prime importance, the reinvigoration of the Camp David peace process in an effort to resolve fairly the underlying Arab-Israeli dispute.

Lebanon, of course, has suffered grievously over the last several months, let alone the last several years. Phil Habib's and Morris Draper's successful negotiations of the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut established the first phase of our approach to the problem in Lebanon. The U.S. Marine contingent in the multinational forces completed this withdrawal from Beirut at 2 a.m. this morning, well within the 30-day period the President specified in his notification to you.

The French and Italian contingents will begin their withdrawal soon. The Government of Lebanon, meanwhile, is working carefully but surely to reestablish authority over all parts of Beirut with the Lebanese Army and police increasingly assuming security responsibilities in the city.

A second phase in our Lebanon diplomacy is now before us. As all of you know, the President is sending Ambassador Draper to Lebanon to begin negotiations on withdrawal of foreign forces from that country. The President has made it clear that he personally intends to stay fully engaged in efforts to bring about a strong, free, united, and healthy Lebanon, sovereign throughout all its territories within internationally recognized borders.

The withdrawal of all military forces from Lebanon must be accompanied by the creation of conditions in southern Lebanon to preserve Israeli security. In the immediate future, we will seek a further stabilization in the situation in Beirut. We must create an environment in Lebanon that will allow the newly elected Lebanese Government, free of outside pressure or imposed solutions, to carry on with its task of national reconciliation. The desperate need for economic reconstruction can be well served through such reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The United States is a staunch friend of the Lebanese people, and will be a good partner in Lebanon's courageous effort to rebuild its economy and to strengthen its national institutions. We will exercise our responsibility and duty to give every opportunity to the Lebanese themselves to recreate a united but pluralistic society behind strong leadership from the newly elected president.

We also look forward to cooperating with appropriate international institutions in the effort to ameliorate the destruction caused by the long and most unfortunate fighting. I think there is pretty good indication that Tom Claussen and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] will play a part in this effort, and I think if they do that will be very helpful.

These efforts to rebuild Lebanon and strengthen its institutions can only be helped by progress in the overall search for Middle East peace. The problems of Lebanon are distinct and must be addressed whenever possible separately from our Middle East peace initiative, but both tasks must be carried on without delay.

The President will therefore dispatch Ambassador Draper to Lebanon this weekend, while we also continue to work on the overall peace initiative.

When I was before you in the confirmation hearings, I noted our commitments to solving the Palestinian problem within the Camp David framework. Right after your vote to report my nomination favorably to the full Senate, the President called me in and instructed me that he wished high priority to be placed on addressing the underlying Arab-Israel dispute, especially the Palestinian issues.

The President's statement last week began a fresh start on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The fundamental problems involved are of universal concern, not just to the people of the region, but to the United States and other countries as well. The events of the last month has demonstrated that we Americans have a special responsibility in the efforts to bring peace to the area. No one else has the credibility and therefore the ability to provide the crucial link to all sides.

The President's Middle East peace initiative is based on an intensive and detailed review of the problem. We have discussed the issues in detail with members of this committee, as you have noted, and others in the Congress, with former Government officials and many knowledgeable people.

The paramount conclusions of that review are, one, it is time to address forcefully and directly the underlying Palestinian issues, and two, genuine success depends upon broadening participation in the negotiation to include as envisaged in the Camp David accords Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

In taking this initiative, the President established two conditions. We will remain fully committed to both the principles of the Camp David accords and to the security of Israel. The Camp David framework has one key element that all other peace plans lack. It has been successful. It produced the only treaty of peace between Israel and an Arab country and the completion of the disengagement and return of the Sinai.

Moreover, the Camp David framework has the necessary room for negotiations to fulfill the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and to reach peace treaties between Israel and her neighbors.

As President Carter said a week ago:

> There is absolutely nothing in the President's speech nor in the information he sent to the Israelis which is contrary to either the letter or the spirit of Camp David. It is absolutely compatible with the Camp David Agreement.

Our initiative will give the provisions of Camp David their full meaning and a new dynamism. This renewed dynamism for the Camp David negotiations will insure Israeli security, and we emphatically will require the product of the negotiations to do so. As the President's speech noted, this country, this administration and the President personally are committed to Israel's security. The same renewed dynamism also will provide appropriate regard to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements," again, a quotation lifted right out of the Camp David accords.

Camp David itself calls for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza and other Palestinians as agreed to participate in negotiating the two primary means of achieving those rights, a 5-year transitional period of autonomous self-government and final status after the 5-year transitional period. By renewing the process, we seek to fulfill the hope of Camp David, Israel, and her neighbors, Jordan, and the Palestinians engaged in fair, direct, and successful negotiations on how they will all live together.

The Camp David accords provide that these negotiated arrangements on final status must be "just, comprehensive, durable," and "based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their parts." Security Council Resolution 242 sets forth the two key principles, and I am going through this, Mr. Chairman, just to remind ourselves of the history here and the words and the commitments that have been written down and subscribed to:

> One, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied, and two, termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

That is from Resolution 242, as it has often been summarized, peace for territory.

We believe these principles apply on all fronts, but our position on the extent of withdrawal will be significantly influenced by the extent and nature of the peace and security arrangements being offered in return. Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will negotiate the final boundaries, recognizing Palestinian legitimate rights and securing what Resolution 338 calls a "just and durable peace." We will support positions in those negotiations which we believe are fair.

These positions include, first, on the Israeli sovereignty, Palestinian state dimension, it is the President's belief that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved through Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and the Gaza. Accordingly we will not support such a solution. We will also not support the formation of a Palestinian state in those negotiations. There is no foundation of political support in Israel or in the United States for such a solution, and peace cannot be achieved by that route. The preference we will pursue in the final status negotiations is some form of association of the West Bank and Gaza territories with Jordan.

On self-determination, in the Middle East context, the term "self-determination" has been identified exclusively with the formation of a Palestinian state. We will not support this definition of self-determination, attractive though those as words may be. We do believe that the Palestinians must take a leading role in determining their own future and fully support the provision in the Camp David agreement providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement in the final status negotiations.

On Jerusalem, we will firmly support the position that Jerusalem must be undivided, and that its status must be determined through negotiations. We do not recognize unilateral acts with respect to final status issues.

On settlements, Senator Pell has already mentioned this subject. The status of Israeli settlements must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. We will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts, but neither will we support efforts to deny Jews the opportunity to live in the West Bank and Gaza under the duly constituted governmental authority there as Arabs now live in Israel.

Negotiations on the final status of the area will not start until a self-governing authority for the territories is firmly in place. Negotiations about the transitional phase have been in progress for the last 3 years. In those negotiations, we have consistently expressed our views to our negotiating partners, Israel and Egypt, as issues arose. Most recently, we informed our partners of how these separate expressions fit into our overall view of Palestinian self-government during a transitional period.

In our view, the objective of the transitional period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants while insuring that all necessary measures are taken to assure Israeli security.

We have emphasized that this period is transitional, not final, and that, therefore, the provisions relating to it should not prejudice the final status.

In light of those views, we have told our partners that we have supported and will continue to support the definition of full autonomy, giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land and its resources, subject to fair safeguards on water, the inclusion of economic, commercial, social and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan, participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election for the West Bank-Gaza authority, progressive Palestinian responsibility for internal security based on capability and performance.

Using those same standards, we have opposed and will continue to oppose dismantlement of existing settlements, provisions which represent a threat of Israel's security.

As the President noted in his speech, we are attempting to reinvigorate the autonomy negotiations. That effort would be assisted to a great extent by a freeze of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, which was requested during the Camp David negotiations. Our concern is not with the legality or illegality, but with their effects on the peace process.

The President's initiative follows over 3 years of active negotiations, continuous discussions of these issues involved over the same period and, most recently, two trips to the Middle East by the Secretary of State this year and additional trips by Ambassador Fairbanks and by others working on the negotiations.

We have put these ideas in some detail to the Israelis and the key Arab States, including Jordan and Egypt. They are now examining the proposals. It would be surprising if they liked or disliked all of them. We have received reactions from some of our interlocutors directly. We are studying those reactions. We expect to continue our discussions with the Israelis, with the Arab countries and with other friendly governments.

The President has now articulated a reasonable basis for a negotiated compromise among the parties. We emphasize that any agreement must be based on the free give-and-take of the negotiating process. We do not guarantee to any party the outcome of the negotiations on any issue. The President has now stated publicly some U.S. positions on key issues. We now call for the parties contemplated by the Camp David agreement to join us in seeking peace.

Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful for the words of support and encouragement that you and the members of this committee have given. Your emphasis in several interviews on the deep yearning for peace in the countries and peoples of this area, Senator Cranston's and Senator Boschwitz' support for the effort to broaden the process and involve the Jordanians and representatives of the Palestinians, and Senator Mathias' emphasis on the need for all to address this problem objectively are indications that the Congress and the administration are together focused on this essential task.

As you put it:

> There just is not an alternative for finding a basis for lasting peace. Think what could happen to this area in the Middle East if peace is found and a basis for working together with its Arab neighbors is found by Israel and its Arab neighbors.

We now have the initial formal reactions from the Israeli Government and the Arab League summit. The Israeli Government, supported by a vote of the Knesset, has opposed the President's proposal. While not directly addressing the President's proposals, the Arab League summit has put forward its own proposals, the key elements of which are at variance with our proposals.

The President stands firmly behind his proposals. The reactions of the Israeli Government and of the Arab League are clear and graphic evidence that the position of both sides must be negotiated if we are to bring genuine peace and security to this troubled region.

The opening positions have been announced and now is the time for quiet diplomacy to pursue the President's initiative and to bring it to fruition. In launching this initiative, the President determined that he would stay fully involved and fully committed to the principles he enunciated.

We will be working hard over the next weeks, in light of the new dynamic the initiative introduces to bring the peace process forward. I pledge to you that we will be exercising the creativity, the persistence and the dogged determination to succeed which marked the successful effort in Beirut.

I also emphasize to you that we recognize that our effort is to bring a lasting, effective and just peace to this area. That goal can hardly be accomplished in a few short weeks. We ask you to stay with the President in his determination to sustain this effort and to look for the long-term, just solution.

We believe deeply and purposefully that peace can come between Arabs and Jews. No greater purpose can be placed before us all than a just and lasting peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, very much.

We will go on a 10-minute limitation this morning. I would like to first comment. You mentioned in your testimony that the President is sending Ambassador Draper back to Lebanon to begin negotiations. He also should be included among those who have done an outstanding job at tremendous personal sacrifice, as we all saw when we observed him and Phil Habib working.

Is there any kind of a time schedule? We obviously have a President-elect who will not take office for a while, but are we starting to get a time frame for withdrawal of all forces? Certainly it is crucial that the Syrian forces be withdrawn. The need for them in Lebanon certainly has diminished.

Is there any sense of time that you can give to the committee as to what we might expect in the way of a time frame for the withdrawal of all outside forces and the resumption of control of Lebanon by Lebanese forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the first thing is to give a little more breathing room to the city of Beirut so that the new Lebanese Government can establish itself, have a capital city that it controls, and work from there.

And then we have to work out some sort of a program for a sort of synchronized withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces and also to either have the PLO units that are still in northern Lebanon lay down their arms and become part of a peaceful population there or get out. There is no place in a sovereign country for uninvited armed forces within the country. That is basically disruptive and has to be ended.

We believe that it is important to keep the pressure on to have this come about before people get too settled in to where they are. So I do not want to set any exact timetable or schedule at this point. That would be premature. But I do want to assure you we will be working to move the situation.

Because you have two possible armies right up against each other and there is always the possibility of an outbreak, if they stay there too long I guess you would have to say there is the probability of an outbreak. So getting them separated is important.

I got some encouragement from reading the communique issued by the Arab summit and we have just received this and will have to analyze it and talk to people so that we understand it better than just reading the words. But I think on this subject the words are quite clear and I am reading:

> The conference has been notified of the decision of the Lebanese Government ending the task of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon, provided that negotiations be conducted between the Lebanese and the Syrian Governments to make the arrangements in the light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

In other words, the mandate that was placed there, which to some extent was pointed to as the reason why the Syrians had to stay, that has been taken away. And so now the Lebanese Government has a little better ability to express itself and I think there is a greater freedom of movement from the standpoint of the Syrians. So that is a good step.

Those are the things we have in mind, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you could comment on the U.S. role in the reconstruction of Lebanon. The destruction is terrible. I did not see a single building there that was not filled with shell holes and the living and physical conditions were described to me vividly by some of the American troops.

When I asked them what concerns they had about personal safety, they said "the only concerns we really have are sleeping at night. Look at that building over there," and they pointed to a building. "That is where we sleep. It is filled with rats because of the garbage that has been around, and every night someone will have a rat jump right on them."

The city has to be cleaned up. What role is the United States going to play in this? Can we also play a role, as I discussed with the outgoing President—and I am delighted he is going to devote himself in rebuilding the private sector in Beirut—in helping the private sector in making Beirut a center of commerce as it has been in the past.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we must play a constructive role in helping the Lebanese rebuild their physical structure as well as their society. It seems to me we have the following steps.

First, there is the humanitarian aid that has been coming forth, and that is needed on an immediate basis. We are doing our part in that and there are many other agencies—the Red Cross in particular, but also others—that are playing a very constructive and thoughtful role here.

Second, we need to help in assessing what the extent of the damages are and what it takes to reconstruct.

Third, it seems to me, while being willing to play our part we should build on the international concern and willingness to help in Lebanon, and that is one reason why it seemed to me of great interest to engage the World Bank in this. But they will try to draw funds from many sources and identify projects and use the skills that they have. So that is a next step.

I think public funds that would go to reconstruction undoubtedly would concentrate on matters of infrastructure, but it is my feeling and observation that Lebanon has been over the years a very attractive country for private capital. And it seems to me the most important single thing that can be done for the reconstruction of Lebanon is to get conditions of political stability established there so that private entrepreneurs will feel that is a place where they can make investments and build homes, build facilities of one kind or another so that Lebanon's commercial and financial and cultural strengths can come forward.

So those are among the things. I was very interested to see a letter yesterday from Ralph Davidson, the president of Time, saying that a private group of American firms had been formed. They raised $1.5 million as of now, and they are organizing themselves to help purely as a private initiative. They just did that. Nobody asked them to do

it. It is just the American instinct for help coming forward and I hope that there will be a good bit of that.

It is to be commended.

The CHAIRMAN. I would certainly encourage it and I would say to any groups who are thinking of going back and doing that, I have never seen the will of a people stronger than the Lebanese, of all factions. I was delighted at the President-elect's desire to reach out to the Muslim community and be a President of all of Lebanon and pull his country together.

The people yearn, 3 million of them, to be a united country once again.

Secretary SHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, as a former economist, I was interested in one little indicator I heard of from over there. The price of cement, I am told, has doubled. Now I am sure supply will come out and the price will be moderated, but I think it is a very interesting marker of the attitudes of people. Cement is a rebuilding commodity and people are wanting it, and that is a very healthy indicator, it seems to me.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you about the criticism that was leveled by Israel. They were surprised at the President's proposal. They said they were not adequately consulted. They were consulted after others. Particularly I am interested because some of the ideas given by the President, as Senator Pell mentioned, Senator Javits had passed on to me back in June.

We discussed them in detail with Prime Minister Begin, such as no further settlements while the full autonomy talks are going on. These ideas are not startling new ideas. They are ideas consistent with Camp David.

How have you handled that matter with the Israelis and how have you answered the charges that they have made that others were given a full briefing before they were?

Secretary SHULTZ. I can only describe what happened and then you can place whatever interpretation you want on it.

We consulted extensively and, as a matter of fact, one can go way back to the fall of these negotiations that have been going on and note what you said—that there is not any proposal in here that is new in the sense that nobody has ever thought of it before or talked about it.

Basically the positions are positions that Ambassador Fairbanks has advanced and Secretary Haig and others—I think you called them bridging ideas—so it is not as though they are new proposals. It is not as though there has not been a whole lot of listening and including in the last month or so, as visitors came here from Arab countries and from Israel, and we asked them their opinions and so forth.

And, of course, there has been a lot of written material put forward by Minister Sharon, Minister Shamir, when they were here, and subsequently. So there has been a great deal of consultation of that kind.

Now, when it came to actually putting forward these positions and saying we are going to put these forward as public positions that the United States will simply say we will stand by these positions, there we had to scratch our heads a lot and a very high proportion of the people with whom we consulted—including members of the Israel Government—said to us now the key here, if we are going to get any-

where, is to get Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people, as it says in Camp David, to come in and talk.

So we said well, that being the case, we agree with that. Perhaps the first thing we ought to do is very quietly and privately talk to King Hussein, and we did that, and see if what we got out of this was just a negative or what. We could not expect that he would just climb on board, but to find out what the mood is and whether or not we could contemplate going forward, what his attitude would be as we contemplated going forward. We did that.

Having done that and thinking about it further, we felt that we should proceed and it seems to us, well, then, to talk to each of the key governments involved through our Ambassadors located in those countries, those Ambassadors having been back here and having been consulted about this, and read into our material and had their views brought in—again a kind of consultation. So we developed a set of talking points and a letter from the President to the head of state of the different countries.

And each of the Ambassadors had that. The talking points were basically identical and those materials were gone over with each head of state privately.

One of the things that you have to face in anything important in public life is that it does not remain confidential very long, like, I mean, 3 or 4 minutes.

[Laughter.]

It is very quick and people find out about it very quickly. And we saw that what the President was proposing was coming out very fast. And so it seemed to the President that he ought to put forward his proposals in his way for himself and, therefore, he made his address. He made it a little bit quicker than he might otherwise have done had the leaks not happened so fast—public information so fast. But rather than have other people put his proposal forward for him, despite their reactions to it, we feel that the United States should put its foot forward for itself, on its own, and do it quickly.

So that is the process that took place and I think it is a pretty good process, frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I concur with it also.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Somewhat off the subject, but maybe you could enlighten us. As of 9 this morning I understand all the telephone lines, conversations were cut off with the Soviet Union. Is there a reason for that? Is it because of a change in government there? Does it have anything to do with the Near East situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. I have just heard that myself, Senator, and I do not think I will comment on it because I do not know anything more than just what you have said. We do know that they cut out the dialing a little bit ago, so obviously there is something going on that causes them to want to have tight control over incoming and outgoing messages.

Can you imagine doing that in the United States? That puts one more marker on the distinction between these two countries.

Senator PELL. I concur in approving the broad outlines of the President's proposal. It must have merit if both Arafat's No. 2, Abu Iyad and Mr. Begin, the two extremes here, both oppose it as of now. It

seems to me it must be approaching something of a middle ground, which is where we usually like to come out.

I was wondering if you thought there is any way of achieving this freeze on the settlement about which the chairman spoke and about which I spoke earlier, and whether in approaching it we could perhaps dust off, resurrect, the Allon plan which, to my mind, had a good deal of merit a few years ago.

Secretary SHULTZ. Our approach to this is to emphasize always, first and foremost, the possibility of peace and to hold that up in front of people as the grand objective. I do think given the nature of the positions being put forward by the President on behalf of the United States that continued expansion of the settlements is not a constructive contribution to peace and we ought to say that and be clear about it and not mince any words.

That is the posture that we are in right now. What the President has put forward has been compared to a variety of other plans and I think that is fitting in the sense that, again, it shows that there is a lot of continuity here in development of these ideas which gives them strength.

But fundamentally what the President did was not to try to split the difference or duplicate some other plan but put forward some positions of his own that he thinks are fair and have a good chance of leading to peace.

Senator PELL. To draw you out a little further on this, do you feel that the Begin government can be persuaded to halt the settlements policy while this process is going on? Do you have any cause for optimism in this regard?

Secretary SHULTZ. Only my conviction that the opportunity for peace will be a very strong motivating factor anywhere, including in Israel, especially in Israel perhaps. And we need to bring that opportunity forward.

Of course, a lot will depend on whether or not in the end King Hussein or other qualified representatives say yes, we will come and sit down with Israel and try to work this out. I think that is a critical element in this picture.

Senator PELL. I noticed in your earlier response about involving King Hussein in this process, running it by him, you did not say what his reaction had been to it. Would you feel at liberty to tell us how far you feel King Hussein would be willing to go in this regard? I had a 2-hour conversation with him some weeks back and I was just curious why you feel he would be willing to——

Secretary SHULTZ. I can say that he considers the President's proposals as very serious and important proposals and he is studying them carefully and they are by no means being rejected out of hand at all. So the question is very much open.

Senator PELL. I am very glad to hear that.

In regard to the reconstruction of Lebanon, in view of the fact that all of the damage was done by American weapons, although in other people's hands, is there any fallout of anti-Americanism on the part of the Lebanese and other Arabs because of this?

Secretary SHULTZ. Obviously there have been tremendous reactions throughout the Arab world to the whole Lebanon operation and there has been a great negative fallout on the United States. At the same time, Senator, I think it is also apparent to everybody that in the end

it was the United States that played the most constructive role that brought people together, that developed the plan that saved the city of Beirut and the other citizens of Beirut.

The Government of Lebanon has been very appreciative and conscious of that. So I think that our capacity to be helpful is strong.

Senator PELL. I am glad to hear that, and you feel that the American presence or position there is one of respect?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I do. Senator Percy has just been there, and perhaps he would want to comment. There is nothing like a view from being there. I only read these cables. I go crazy with these things. You have been there. You have talked to the incoming President.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very encouraged, very much so. I was skeptical and told them so at the beginning of our conversations, and left very encouraged by what I had heard and what the President-elect intends to do. For instance, he intends to go right down south and live a couple of nights in the area. He intends to face up to a lot of the problems that he is well aware of. I think Ambassador Fairbanks knows the nature of those problems, but I was impressed with the vigor with which he is approaching them.

Senator PELL. Finally, Mr. Secretary, the Israeli cabinet seems very concerned that allowing Arabs in East Jerusalem to vote in the elections for the self-governing authority could lead, as they put it, to a repartition of Jerusalem. Is there grounds for worry in this regard? I can see the political grounds for it, but I wondered what you thought.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, if they think there is grounds for worry, I suppose there is grounds for worry, but from our perspective, what we have said is, our position is, there should be an undivided Jerusalem. We have been very straightforward about that. We have not minced any words, and at the same time there are people there who are not citizens of Israel. They do not vote in Israeli elections. They are there, and there is going to be a self-governing authority, we hope, during a transition period, and so it seems reasonable to us that they ought to have a chance to have an impact on that self-governing authority. That is the simplicity of it. I do not see that that does constitute grounds for concern about a redivision of the city of Jerusalem.

Senator PELL. Finally, Mr. Secretary, the Mideast peace plan adopted by the Arab leaders at Fez as reported in the press included the implicit recognition of Israel. Do you agree with the interpretation, and what is your reaction to the Arab peace plan, having had a chance to study it?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have just gotten it this morning, and I think before trying to give any extensive interpretation I want to study it and talk to people and hear people tell me about what lies behind it and so on. On its face, of course, the positions taken are at considerable variance from positions the President has taken on key and important issues, and that is clear. So we will have to see what it means. Many have interpreted the point in here, point 7, as being an implicit recognition of Israel and a similar type of phraseology in the Fahd plan that was around about a year ago. That was a similar kind of thing, and that was interpreted as recognition of Israel by some Saudi Arabian officials.

So, perhaps that is so. I hope that is so. I think the key item here again is, will somebody show up at the negotiating table? Then you can start talking, and the fact that people have positions is not so important as will they come and talk about it and try to resolve the differences. That is what we have to find out.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Hayakawa?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Secretary Shultz.

Secretary SHULTZ. Good morning, Senator.

Senator HAYAKAWA. First of all, I want to say that I was deeply moved and impressed by the President's speech in which he announced his plan for peace in the Middle East. I do have some questions about it, however, essentially for clarification, not for the sake of argument. How long has King Hussein been King of Jordan?

Secretary SHULTZ. About 30 years. We have a former Ambassador here.

Senator HAYAKAWA. How strong is the central authority in Lebanon? And if the PLO is invited to move its population to Gaza and the West Bank, to what degree will Lebanon be able to control that population? That is to say, the PLO is invited to have its own form of self-government, but not as an independent government, but under the supervision of Lebanon, is it not?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, sir, I think there are many lessons to be learned from the tragedy of Lebanon over the last, say, 7 years, let alone the last couple of months or so, and one of the lessons surely is that the existence of an armed state within a state is not compatible with stability, so whether you are talking about Lebanon, whether you are talking about any other country in the Middle East or anywhere, that is a condition that cannot be tolerated, and the emergence of a strong Central Government of Lebanon certainly carries with it the idea that that strong Central Government is going to be the armed force in that country, and there is not going to be any other. The same thing would be true in other areas.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So Lebanon will have the will and the force and the strength to enforce order and authority over the PLO and anybody else within its borders?

Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly that is the objective, and I don't see any reason why that cannot be so if we support it properly and others do and help to bring that to pass. It is a big job, because it is not just a question of armaments and things like that. The fundamental problems here are that you have any different communities, and they need to be reconciled together and brought together, and it is a very complicated and difficult task of government.

We speak of politics often in this country, sometimes in a derogatory way, but it is the highest art to create the politics and the sense of governmental processes to reconcile people with different views and bring them into something that has stability to it, and that is the task the Government of Lebanon faces. It is a darned hard task, and they need all the help and sympathy they can get. It is not just a question of muscle.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So you think it is possible that with our help and the help of others, that Lebanon can maintain that order?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And, sir, you have stated that we will not recognize the PLO as legitimate representatives of the Palestinians unless they get off this guerrilla kick and recognize Israel's right to exist. I had the opportunity to meet with Palestinian Americans, and they were a group of very nice ladies who looked characteristic of ladies who might be members of the League of Women Voters, and I asked if there could not be a distinction made between a political Palestinian group as opposed to the PLO as a guerrilla group, and they said to me, we are the PLO.

So, my question is something like this. Whom are we to recognize as representing the Palestinian people? The PLO or one of its many branches, or those who claim not to be part of the PLO at all, if there are such?

Secretary SHULTZ. First, you identify one of the problems, that there are many branches, and they differ in their outlook, and so you are not too sure then precisely what it is you are dealing with. The President's approach in his proposals is to say Jordan is Israel's next door neighbor, and is going to be involved in this process. So, when Jordan has a very strong proportion of Palestinian Arabs in its populations, I think on the order of 60 percent or so, so let King Hussein come into this process, and let us find people who can represent Palestinian interests, and there must be some on the West Bank and Gaza living there—after all, that is the terrain that is most immediately involved—and develop a process of representation somehow. That is the object.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The ladies sound fine.

Secretary SHULTZ. My remarks did not comment on sex at all. It was representational.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Secretary Shultz. It is a very difficult task that the administrations confronts in this.

Secretary SHULTZ. It is not only the administration, and I think that is really the point of all the discussion we have had here, and the statements that have been made by members of this committee and many, many others. The administration cannot do anything unless it is based on a broad feeling of support, and I think perhaps one of the most appealing things about what has happened is that there has been an outpouring of support in this country from all directions.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I certainly feel that there is that support being generated right now, and spreading today as we discuss this matter. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following on the question of the stability of Lebanon, which I think is absolutely vital if we are to make any progress, and give the various parties the willingness to pull out of that situation there, do you envision us helping to build the internal military capability or the internal security forces of Lebanon solo or in conjunction with other nations, or what are your plans along that line? It seems to me that is the key before we can move on to almost anything else.

Secretary SHULTZ. Senator, it seems to me that it is basically up to the Government of Lebanon to develop themselves. That is where the prime responsibility has to be, and the role that we seek to play is the

role of partner and helpful friend, and to be responsive where we think it is appropriate in helping to construct that central authority. Now, we have had discussions with them over the years, and there are many people in the Lebanese Government and in the Lebanese military, for example, who have been trained in this country, so that gives us a certain tie.

What precisely is needed probably is not known right now. What is known is that even after you take the Israeli, Syrian, and the PLO forces out, I understand there are more armaments per capita in Lebanon even after all that has been removed than practically any other country. That does not mean they are the right armaments in the right hands for a central government to operate. Part of the problem may be to have more, but surely part of the problem is to have less or in different proportions and different places.

Senator GLENN. What is our estimate as to Gemayel's ability to control the internal situation? Does he have sufficient security forces or military forces to control Lebanon now?

Secretary SHULTZ. Our estimate is that he is a strong and effective individual, and he has a very good chance of becoming a strong and effective leader in Lebanon.

Senator GLENN. How about the actual military forces that he has available to him?

Secretary SHULTZ. He has on his own, and of course there are all these different militia groups, and his own is one of the most effective, but the problem is to merge these forces into something that you might call a national force. That is, not belonging to any particular faction. That is difficult.

Senator GLENN. I was told there were some 12 batallions of Lebanese forces that were basically up north during most of this fighting, that was still basically intact. Is that correct, and does he control those forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. I cannot comment on that in detail. Perhaps, Nick, can you?

Mr. VELIOTES. No, I cannot.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not want to respond. I am not truly posted on that.

Senator GLENN. Do we have any plan, do we have any contingency funding for that, or military forces that he has asked for, or support that has been requested of us that we are considering?

Secretary SHULTZ. There have been requests, and what we are going to do and have agreed to do is to send a team of people from our Defense Department to survey the situation with them and help them understand what their situation is from a military standpoint, and analyze what is needed and what needs to be done.

Senator GLENN. Are we going to do that survey in conjunction with other countries that we think might be interested, or will this be a solo U.S. operation?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, this particular thing, I think that is a request that they made of us, and we said, yes, we will consult with you about that and give you our advice. That is just pure advice. That is not the providing of any armaments or anything of that kind.

Senator GLENN. Is there any thought at this time that outside military forces might have to go into Lebanon for any period of time to help maintain stability there while they get their act together?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the critical area is the area in southern Lebanon which was the initial objective of the Israeli move, and some arrangement will have to be developed as the Israeli Armed Forces leave or in conjunction with them leaving to provide security in that area so that it will not become a place from which northern Israel is harassed and shelled and so forth, and there are many different ideas as to how that might be done, but we think that an expanded and strengthened United Nations force—there has been one there, perhaps not as effective as it might have been, but people have to allow these forces to be effective, and at any rate, perhaps that is one way of dealing with that problem.

Senator GLENN. That was going to be my next question. There are still some 7,000 UNIFIL troops in southern Lebanon that have been bypassed, and are just sitting there, more or less, that I felt originally could have been used for the West Beirut situation, but are they completely ineffectual now? Or is there an effort being made to reconstitute them or make them more effective so that they can be the stabilizing force?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is one of the options that we think is very much worth exploring and working on, and we hope that that can come to pass.

Senator GLENN. Out of the Camp David framework as one proposal, the Israeli position is one proposal, and the Arab League proposal as a third, do you see right now a common ground? Are there any points where we are in unison as a basis from which to start negotiating other things?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think perhaps there is a unified feeling, even unspoken, that the big lesson of recent history, let alone the history of years past, is the need for peace, and we hope that that can be the unifying idea that will drive people to make the compromises that they will have to make in order for that to come about.

Senator GLENN. I would hope the same thing, but are there any specifics in any of the proposals now that we can say, here are one, two, three points where everybody does agree, and we can at least start with that? I know everyone hopes for peace, but are there any specifics in the proposal so far that we can use as a basis to start negotiating?

Secretary SHULTZ. It has been suggested that perhaps point 7 implies recognition of Israel. We recognize Israel, Egypt recognizes Israel, so perhaps that is one piece of common ground, and if so, that is a genuine breakthrough. Now, it may not sound like much to you, but it is a big piece of movement in people's attitudes, very, very important.

Ambassador Fairbanks suggests that there is a general recognition that you are not going to go from the current situation to some final situation. There is going to have to be a transition period, and while the nature of it and the duration of it varies, even in the Arab summit communique, a transition period is spoken of. So, that concept is something that is taking a little hold.

Senator GLENN. As you and I discussed once before and over the telephone a time or two, I would hope we could get concessions as a result of our having gone in there with military forces. I felt we could get a quid pro quo maybe from some people, and I hope we have not

lost the opportunity now that our Armed Forces are out, for example, for Lebanon to recognize the Camp David Accords, an Arab recognition, and the PLO perhaps for no more terrorism, and Israel to get the West Bank back in the peace process. All of these things we had hoped we might be able to get, and that is a real wish list, I agree.

Secretary SHULTZ. We need you, Senator, on our team, if you could do all those things.

Senator GLENN. We agree on what we would like to see, but I just hope we have not lost some of our options. One of the big differences is in the different views that people take with regard to that area as far as its long-term outcome. Prime Minister Begin's view that Biblical Israel, you open your family Bible, and in the back one Biblical Israel goes clear to the Euphrates River, which encompasses a good part of Syria, of course, and much of Lebanon.

Secretary SHULTZ. A lot of people have noticed that. You are not the only one to notice that.

Senator GLENN. Judea Samaria, which Prime Minister Begin points out, and in recent statements with regard to the West Bank, are very definitive that that will never be outside Israel's control, no matter what, again, forever.

How do you work your way around this emphasis on Biblical Israel, I guess is my question?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not know how we work our way around that one. There are lots of differences of opinion to be negotiated about, but let me just review from the Camp David Accords. I have a page from it here. It says, and we are now speaking about the final status negotiations, "The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Resolution 242." I read some stuff from that. "Negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the locations of the boundaries."

Well, I do not know. To me, and I recognize that people can argue these things, but to me what that means is that the boundaries that are there now are not necessarily the boundaries that are going to be there after the negotiations are through. It does not say where they will be, but there is certainly a fair inference that they might be different. And that is signed by Mr. Begin somewhere here.

Senator GLENN. You take a positive approach to it.

Secretary SHULTZ. Sure. As a negotiator, you have to take a positive approach or you are dead.

Senator GLENN. My time is up, but I would like to just make a statement, not a question here. I hope somewhere along here, too, we are also getting back to what might have prevented some of the problem, and that is what we have talked about in times past, the offensive-defensive use of U.S. supplied weapons.

I know this is probably not the time to discuss that necessarily, but some time, if we are going to prevent any of these things in the future, we have to really mean what we say about offensive-defensive use of weapons. I think to the rest of the world it appears that when we finally were willing to put our foot down to some extent, that we really did control the situation perhaps in the final analysis to some extent, which means we could not possibly have controlled it more all the way along. At least that is the view of the rest of the world. So I think we have to get some better definitions on that in the future, too.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you seem to be holding up well under all the exigencies of office. Are you enjoying yourself?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Good. What do you do in all your spare time?

[General laughter.]

My line of questioning will deal not with the esoteric or the speculative, but somewhat more prosaic aspects. How many Syrian troops are still in Lebanon today? Have you covered that earlier?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir, I have not, but we do have estimates of that, about 30,000.

Senator HELMS. 30,000. Are there any Soviet bloc advisers with these troops?

Secretary SHULTZ. There may be. Ambassador Veliotes thinks probably not in Lebanon, but there are in Syria.

Senator HELMS. How about Cuban?

Secretary SHULTZ. Not to our knowledge, no Cubans.

Senator HELMS. You had no indication of that?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. Did you mention a figure with respect to the PLO guerrillas still in Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir. In northern Lebanon there are some. We have some rough estimates. It is a little hard to know exactly. Any numbers that I give you here are rough estimates. We have no way of counting them.

Senator HELMS. 10,000 is the information I have heard.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that is probably as good a ball park figure as anyone has.

Senator HELMS. Where are they primarily?

Secretary SHULTZ. In the northern part, around Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley.

Senator HELMS. Are there any Soviet bloc advisers with them?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the answer is the same. Probably not in Lebanon, but there are Soviet bloc advisers in Syria.

Senator HELMS. Do you know of any Cubans?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir, we do not. I do not say flatly there are none, but we do not know of any.

Senator HELMS. Do you know of any guerrillas from any Latin American country?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir. Again, I am not saying flatly there are none. We just do not know of any.

Senator HELMS. When the PLO left Beirut, and you discussed this, and I am sorry I had another committee meeting—that is endemic to the situation.

Secretary SHULTZ. You people are a little busy, too, I have noticed.

Senator HELMS. When the PLO left, did you discuss or were you discussing when I came in the heavy weaponry that they turned over to the Lebanese Army?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, that is one of the difficult points, getting that heavy weaponry into the hands of the Central Government of Lebanon somehow, and there has been a considerable amount of ten-

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sion and strain about that point. I am going to ask either of these gentlemen to interject, since they are better informed on many of these details than I am.

Mr. VELIOTES. Some of the heavy weapons we know have been turned over. There is an undetermined number that have not. We are assuming that as the Lebanese Army progressively takes over West Beirut, and that is going quite well today, that these weapons will also be flushed out and taken back.

Secretary SHULTZ. In order to do this, as I understand it, you have to go really block by block, building by building. It is a very laborious process.

Senator HELMS. What I am getting at, of course, and your answer would probably have to be speculative on that, are there instances where these weapons are in the hands of people who would frustrate the efforts for peace?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am sure there are some weapons on the hands of some people who would be glad to frustrate the efforts for peace. I believe it is also true that the vast and growing preponderance is in the hands of people who want to bring about a strong Central Government in Lebanon and attain stability for Beirut first and Lebanon extended from that. That is the trend that we want to encourage.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I know that all Senators have questions. I yield back the balance of my time. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator SHULTZ. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I also want to address the Lebanon situation. I missed your response to Senator Percy's questions, so if this is repetitious, please excuse me. Could you just summarize briefly the sequence of events that you now anticipate happening in Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. We did talk about this. Very briefly, first, more breathing room around Beirut, so that the Central Government of Lebanon can take charge more and more, control their own capital city, and work out from there. Second, to establish some sort of synchronized program for the disengagement of the Syrian and the Israeli forces leading to their withdrawal. Connected with that, we are interested in the statement, in the communique from the Arab summit that basically ends the mandate for the Arab deterrent force, which has become the Syrian force, and that is a positive development.

Third, there needs to be developed some method for providing security against emplacements or people in southern Lebanon juxtaposed to the northern Israeli border, so that there isn't a development again of capacity to shell and harass the Israelis. And then perhaps we can see the withdrawal here. There are also PLO forces in northern Lebanon, and either they must lay down their arms and become a part of Lebanon within the structure of the Lebanese Government or leave.

Senator SARBANES. Do you have any estimate of a timeframe within which these various developments might take place?

Secretary SHULTZ. We talk about timetables within the Department as we work on this and try to set targets for ourselves, but we think it is not wise to set them out in any public way beyond saying that this is something that we need to keep the pressure on and try to get things moving, so that the departure of foreign forces actually

does happen promptly. I do not want to pin it down to a number of days, though.

Senator SARBANES. In your statement you say the problems of Lebanon are distinct and must be addressed whenever possible separately from the initiative in the Middle East.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Do you see the initiative as impeding or setting back in any way the efforts to move ahead on resolving the situation in Lebanon and at least having that situation settled and normalized?

Secretary SHULTZ. I see it the other way around. That is, it seems to me that if a peace process addressing itself to the problems of the Palestinians among other things more directly and forcefully can be visibly gotten into motion, then that should be helpful and reassuring insofar as Lebanon is concerned. So, I can see a certain complementarity here, and I do not see any down side.

Senator SARBANES. Is Ambassador Draper now going to assume a role comparable to Ambassador Habib's in the Lebanon situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. To some degree, yes. Ambassador Habib will also go back to Lebanon, although Ambassador Draper will be in the lead role. He has been designated by the President to work on the diplomatic aspects of the Lebanon development and to chair a task force within the Department on that, and Peter McPherson, the director of AID, has been delegated to work on the economic side, and the Deputy Secretary of State, now Walter Stoessel, and if the committee and the Senate are willing, then Kenneth Dam will give direction to that task force and work on the Lebanese situation.

So, we tried to set up a structure for that and give it strength and support.

Senator SARBANES. My time is limited. Obviously, I am not going to have enough time to go into all of the specifics of the President's initiative. I am curious about the self-determination question. I take it that your very clear and strong position is that self-determination does not encompass the formation of an independent Palestinian state. Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is one of the problems that those words, which are such appealing words and which have special strength in the United States, because we believe in self-determination, those words have come to mean an independent Palestinian state, so we decline to use them just because they have taken on that special meaning. But certainly what we envisage is the emergence of what is called in the Camp David accords a self-governing authority that essentially springs from the consent of those that are going to be governed.

Senator SARBANES. But the self-governing authority would not extend to the concept of an independent Palestinian state.

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir.

Senator SARBANES. That is correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. You are correct, in our view.

Senator SARBANES. Now, you talk about that, and there is also reference to some association with Jordan. Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. What does that concept embrace?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there are many ways in which that might develop, and we have put forward the idea that some sort of an association with Jordan would be a workable way to conceive of how

that piece of territory might be governed. It seems to me if you say that it is not going to be sovereign territory of Israel, and it is not going to be an independent state, then it has to be something. There has to be some way of giving it a center of gravity, and an association with Jordan seemed to us to be a workable one.

Now, as I say, there are many different ways of thinking of how that could be done.

Senator SARBANES. Well, of course, there is the concern with respect to Israeli security.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think you could develop such a concept and still insure Israel's security?

Secretary SHULTZ. In the President's proposals that is a central feature, and has to in our view be up front all the time.

Senator SARBANES. What will change in the situation, as you envision it, since at an earlier time Jordan in effect held this area, in effect was ruling it, and Israel's security nontheless came under assault owing that earlier period? What is it that leads you to think that, in returning to something approaching that situation that previously existed, when Israel's security did come under attack this would not again happen. What now enables you to provide assurances that this is going to be a peaceful situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. First of all, I think, in determining the physical arrangements in the territory, great concern and effort needs to be made to identify aspects that will contribute to the security of Israel, places, in other words, where Israel's military presence would be and would help in that regard.

Second, I think we would—I am sure, at least from the U.S. standpoint, that we would see that as essentially being demilitarized in the sense of any capacity to conduct an offensive anywhere.

Third, and perhaps most important, particularly if this process can build, a big difference is, there would be recognition of Israel. There would be a peace treaty in the end. And so, the whole atmosphere, if it is possible to bring this about, would change.

Senator SARBANES. I see my time has expired. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Mathias?

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, a few minutes ago I left the room to take a call, the one telephone call which can never be declined, from my wife.

[General laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. I thought you might have had a different call.

[General laughter.]

Senator MATHIAS. No; you can even decline those calls, but this one you cannot. As is often the case with Members of the Senate. I was asked to be a messenger. She is a native of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Senator TSONGAS. Why didn't she call me?

[General laughter.]

Senator MATHIAS. She is my constituent now.

[General laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. One of mine, too. I hasten to add.

Senator MATHIAS. Like many New Englanders, cut from the hard

rock of that land, she bestows praise with great prudence. She asked me to tell you that she thought you were doing a good job.

[General laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I wish you would tell her that I appreciate it.

Senator MATHIAS. I think the President did a very useful thing by highlighting in his speech the dual nature of this problem, the absolute necessity of reassuring the Israelis as to their security in the future, and the fact that the United States is committed to that security, and at the same time giving equal emphasis to the needs of the Palestinians for national self-expression.

I think that in the hurly-burly of individual crises we sometimes concentrate on one or the other, and do not put into focus as he did the fact that these are two problems that have to be resolved simultaneously. I think that that is a useful contribution, aside from whatever other values his speech may have had, but I notice in your statement today that you say the President has now articulated a reasonable basis for a negotiated compromise among the parties, and I think it might be useful for us on this committee and perhaps for people beyond this committee to understand clearly exactly what you mean.

Is the President laying out an option? Is this a possibility? Is this a choice you could make? Is this an alternative? Or is this a plan which the U.S. Government will work to see adopted?

Secretary SHULTZ. I would put it this way, Senator. What the President has done is set out positions that the United States will support in negotiations. Other people will bring other points of view and positions to the table. We are a full partner in this process. So what the negotiating process will bring out, of course, depends on what happens there. We are not saying what we think has to be the answer.

The President, on the other hand, has not set out a plan in detail at all. He has set out what you might think of as certain boundaries on how we think this might come out. He has set out the boundary of no independent Palestinian state. He has set out the boundary of the necessity for strong attention, as you pointed out, to the securtiy needs of Israel. He set out the boundary of not accepting the idea that all of this territory would be sovereign Israeli territory.

So, certain boundary conditions have been set out. but within those boundaries there is a tremendous amount of detail that has to be worked out, and it can vary a great deal depending upon the negotiations, so all it does is sort of set out the terrain as we see it, and others may see it differently, and our hope is that what will happen is, the right people will be sitting around the table talking about it and trying to talk it out.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, obviously, you cannot have a negotiation unless you get people around the table, and that is the first clear message that ought to go out. But you would envision this as more than just the laying out of options?

Secretary SHULTZ. These are positions that we intend to support, and we have stated them publicly, in part, as a way of letting people know in advance what we will be talking about, giving some reassurance, and at the same time saying to people who, let us say, advocate an independent Palestinian state, we are saying, we hope you come in,

but do not come in under the assumption that somehow we are going to wind up agreeing to that. We are not. We want you to know that in advance. But that is not saying that everybody has to take that position. That is our position.

Senator MATHIAS. In connection with reassuring Israel, let me say I agree with the statement that you have made that we should not threaten, we should not use dull, blunt instruments to try to bludgeon Israel into some acceptance for the President's plan. However, we do have some difficulties, it seems to me, in trying to, on the one hand, persuade the Israelis of the equity and justice of the plan. Is that not really what we are seeking here, a just solution? Persuading the Israelis of the equity and justice of the President's proposal, while at the same time maintaining our commitment for their security and survival?

How do you envision this particular part of the process moving forward?

Secretary SHULTZ. Simply on the basis of trying to give more and more reality to the possibility of peace. Peace is a winner, we think. It is the big motivating factor, and the more it seems possible, I think, the more willing people will be to reach for it and to make the compromises that will be necessary to get there, and we think it is most important to put that positive objective up front all the time with the Israelis, with the Arabs, with ourselves.

There is perhaps some tendency here to be saying that the problem is the intransigence of the Israelis. There are plenty of other people who have demonstrated intransigence. Our object must be to create a negotiating atmosphere in which people can feel that some of the positions they may have taken in the past can be altered somewhat, although I am sure that the fundamental commitment to Israeli security will never be altered, not by us, not by Israel, and the question is, are there ways of getting at it different from ways that have been thought of before if the context is different?

Senator MATHIAS. With the enormous potential involved here, economic development which could follow from peace, the recent rise in the standard of living throughout the Middle East, including Israel itself, where taxation and inflation are keeping the standard of living down——

Secretary SHULTZ. I think you put your hand on a most important matter there, that peace is more than an absence of war. Peace is more than security. Peace is an opportunity for a much broader flourishing of cultural life, of social life, of economic life throughout the region.

Senator MATHIAS. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Tsongas?

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, when I watched the President's speech, there is one word that kept on popping into my mind, and that word was Shultz, Shultz, Shultz. Did you have the same reaction when you watched the speech?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir. My reaction was Reagan, Reagan, Reagan.

[General laughter.]

Senator TSONGAS. I have no more questions.

[General laughter.]

Well, we clearly differ on that one. There is no middle ground clearly between the two.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would say, if I may, on that that I did have the privilege of working very closely with the President in the development of the ideas that underlay the speech, and on his behalf consulted with many people, including you and others here, and tried to report faithfully to him on all of the things that I had learned, and help him develop this plan.

He spent a lot of time on it, and then when it came to the final moments on it in developing a plan for how we were going to approach different people, he was very heavily involved in that, went over all the talking points, shifted them around somewhat, and in the speech itself we worked back and forth, and he made one important last-minute adjustment. We discussed it.

So, it was very much the President's plan and speech, and I think I have been helpful. Nick and Dick and many others have been helpful. It has been a team effort. But he has been very heavily involved in giving direction to it right from the first moment of my assumption of this office.

Senator TSONGAS. A very loyal statement.

Secretary SHULTZ. It is a description.

Senator TSONGAS. Have we urged Lebanon to sign a peace treaty with Israel?

Secretary SHULTZ. We believe that that would be a very desirable outcome at the right time and under the right circumstances. To have a peace treaty last and really mean something, it seems to us that the government of Lebanon has to have a chance to construct itself and be the government of that country, and then it can decide on something so momentous as a peace treaty, but we think it is highly desirable for that to come about.

Senator TSONGAS. Has that particular issue been raised with Bashir Gemayel by any American official?

Secretary SHULTZ. There has been discussion about it, yes.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me raise the point of where we go from here. It seems to me the President's speech was a kind of preemptive strike, that you have now set the agenda on the President's speech with that as background against which everyone has to respond, and I think it was a very positive move in doing that, and politically very astute. The question is now, how do you make this thing move? Is the intent to basically let the pie sort of stew for a while and see what happens?

Prime Minister Begin in the paper today accuses Washington of trying to undermine him. There clearly has been a split within Israel. Is there any thought of in essence letting time evolve a public opinion internally within Israel, and then moving with that as a basis?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not want to make any comment on internal developments in Israel. That is for the Israelis to work out. We deal with Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli Government, and they take the positions on the part of Israel, and as far as we are concerned, that is it. Any internal debates in Israel are the business of Israel. We want to advocate what our positions are, why we believe they are important, how important it is to achieve peace in that area, and work with the Israeli Government and work with the governments in other areas, and gradually try to construct this.

I do not think and the President does not think that somehow or other there is a magic wand that can be waved and quickly something can be settled. It would be nice if it happened that way, but I think a more realistic expectation is that we have to keep working at this, and there are going to be good moments and bad moments, just as in the long struggle to negotiate the plan in Beirut, and I do not want to put the time scale on them directly, but in Phil's efforts to develop that plan, there were times when everybody was almost ready to give up. Certainly the Israelis had given up on it. But Phil kept plugging away, kept working at it, kept an optimistic spirit about it, and eventually succeeded.

So, I think there is a long haul here, and we have to be ready for a long haul.

Senator TSONGAS. But the point I am trying to make is, it seems to me that you are entering a period of, in essence, allowing things to settle and coalesce, let the reasonability of the argument prevail.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the people are reacting. They are taking their positions and we have to observe that. As I have said earlier in the hearing, I think aside from positions that people take, a critical time is going to be when we try to bring into the negotiating process more people than have been there before. That is, to me, in a sense, more important than the positions people are taking. If another Arab country would come to the bargaining table, then the possibility of peace takes on a kind of reality that it does not have until that moment arrives.

So, that is one thing that we have to give a lot of priority to.

Senator TSONGAS. There was in the recent past, although not so much in the very recent past, a lot of unrest by the Palestinians in the West Bank. Do you see that reoccurring? Do you have any indications that if this thing sits for a while, that you may have to face that as a possibility?

Secretary SHULTZ. Any time you have people living in the status of an occupied territory, you are going to have a lot of problems. There have been elements of repression there that I think are regrettable, but it is part of what life is like in an occupied territory. So, once again it seems to me that that is simply another argument for addressing the problems, finding legitimate representation, and getting about it.

I cannot imagine that anybody in Israel particularly likes the role that they have to play in a territory with more than a million inhabitants who are not their citizens.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me say in closing that I share the sentiments of the spouse of the Senator from Maryland, which reaffirms the Massachusetts connection. But when I was over there, I was very impressed by the people you have working for you, not only Habib, et cetera, but the State Department personnel, very competent and very professional. I think without them we would not be where we are today.

The President is fortunate to have you in your role, but you are also fortunate to have the kinds of people you have over there. I commend you on that.

Secretary SHULTZ. I appreciate your comment about the quality of the people in the Department. I have certainly found that in my brief experience there. It has been a great team, and it was kind of interesting in the ceremony the President held in awarding the Medal of Freedom to Phil. The President invited to the ceremony not so much

all the high-ranking people of the Department, but rather, he cut it a different way, down through the ranks of people who are up all night on the phone with Phil, and so forth, the team that really operated. They all turned out, and of course there was a tremendous warmth and pride both in Phil and Phil in them, and two of them are sitting right here. It is a very good group of people.

Senator TSONGAS. I would hope that this issue would be resolved and the reasonability that you have could be applied to other parts of the globe. For example, issues like the pipeline, Radio Marti, arms control, little things like that.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I got the point. [General laughter.]

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also received one of those calls I cannot decline that the Senator from Maryland was talking about, but I have two, my wife and the Chief downtown, who is out in Utah. But in any case, Mr. Secretary, I join with those Senators who have talked about your conduct in office, which I have admired very much since you have arrived there.

In looking at the text of the declaration from Fez, I am not sure that I draw a great deal of optimism from it. One, the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories; two, dismantling of settlements; three, guaranteeing freedom of worship. That point certainly is not a problem, such freedom has existed. Next the reaffirmation of the PLO. Placing the West Bank and the Gaza under the United Nations. That certainly is not a forward step in my judgment. The establishment of East Jerusalem as the capital, and Palestinian state. The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region, including the independent Palestinian state, and the Secretary Council guarantees the respect of all these principles.

In answering Senator Glenn while I was out of the room, I understand you said that the Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region, including the independent Palestinian state. You felt that that was a great forward motion. I look upon all eight of these points, with the exception of the guarantee of freedom of worship, somewhat along the line as the statement from Khartoum in 1968, just a little more positive tone.

Secretary SHULTZ. So I am not misunderstood, that paragraph 7 that you read, it was asked whether or not if that implies recognition of Israel, did I think that was a forward step, and I said yes, that implies recognition, and I considered it a forward step. I am not saying that it is such a statement, but many have interpreted it so, and there have been similar statements made that officials of Arab governments have pointed to and said, that means we recognize Israel. All I did was point that out.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You said it was a big piece of movement, at least according to the notes that I was given.

Secretary SHULTZ. If it is and is acknowledged to be recognition of Israel, then it is a big forward step, if.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It almost seems to me like this is in different words a restatement of the three notes that come out of Khartoum in 1967. It almost seems that in getting all the 15 Arab States together on a single declaration, which is quite an accomplishment, to say the least, that they have adopted what I would call the lowest common

denominator. It does not seem to me to be very much in the way of forward movement.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we have all had experience with writing communiques, and the question is, is there more than meets the eye? There were, I think, some 4 days of intense discussion, and there is a page of a communique. Now, what all lies behind it? I think that we have to understand better, and foremost, will somebody come forward and sit at a table and discuss these matters? And I think that is a critical point.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. There is no indication that Jordan is going to be involved, and I know that that is a key element in our approach.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; we will have to see about that.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. As you know, I spoke out in favor of the President's speech.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; we appreciated that.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And I spoke out with some dismay about the Prime Minister sending in bulldozers to create new settlements, and picking just that moment to do so. But I must say I am also dismayed about the negative tone of Fez. It is a slim reed of hope to say that in the background it took them 4 days. I would respond by saying it took them 4 days to agree on the lowest common denominator, and that that Security Council involvement also means the Russian involvement. This does not seem to me to be a forward step at all, it is almost a call for the Russians to come back into the picture.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not saying that there are not many problems implied in this document, but there is a lot more to be known about results of the Arab summit. We are going to study it. We are going to try to learn and talk to people, and as I said, the big thing is, will it be possible to broaden participation in the Camp David peace process, and if it is, then we have something going for us. If it is not, we do not.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is certainly hard to know. You earlier read from a text that I have not seen, Mr. Secretary. When we talked about what indications there were that the forces will withdraw from Lebanon, you made that interesting comment about cement prices. Being a businessman, I react to those kinds of things. I also note that bank deposits in Lebanon have gone up during even these very difficult times, and that they have had a very positive trade surplus. I think that they had a $1 billion trade surplus for a little country of 2½ million people.

Secretary SHULTZ. Basically, it has a lot going for it. I think the world owes Lebanon a chance to construct itself and live for itself.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You seem to indicate that the mandate for the Syrian presence in Lebanon—you read from something that suggested the mandate had been withdrawn. I did not see that.

Secretary SHULTZ. The communique as I have it here off the ticker has various parts to it. It has a part on the Horn of Africa and Somalia, and so forth, a part on the Gulf War, on the Arab-Israeli, and then also on Lebanon. The last sentence of the text on Lebanon says:

The conference has been notified of the decision of the Lebanese Government ending the task of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon, provided that negotiations be conducted between the Lebanese and the Syrian Governments to make the arrangements in light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Well, how to read that exactly. The way I read that is that they are saying that if a sychronized withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces can be arranged, fine. The mandate that put the Syrian forces in there in the first place from the Arab League will not impede that process.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I rely on the New York Times text, which might be mistaken, but nevertheless says in the last sentence, "The summit was informed of the Lebanese Government's decision to put an end to the mission of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon. To this effect, the Lebanese and Syrian Governments will start negotiation measures to be taken in light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon," presuming first an Israeli withdrawal.

Is it your understanding, Mr. Secretary, that we will be able to arrange some form of mutuality of withdrawal?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is what we will try to do.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And that there is a feeling among the participants that that can be achieved?

Secretary SHULTZ. There are many preconditions, I am sure. The Israelis will want to know that the Syrians will actually withdraw. They will want to know something about what happens to the PLO that are still there. They will especially want to have assurance that Southern Lebanon will be—the conditions will be so arranged so that there will not again become a base from which Israel is attacked and shelled, and all of those things have to be worked out and thought about, and assurance given, but Israel has taken the formal position, and when Foreign Minister Shamir was here, he told me flatly that Israel did not covet any Lebanon territory, and was prepared to withdraw under the right circumstances.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The Arab League gave the sanctions to the Syrians to be in Lebanon, as I recall.

Secretary SHULTZ. Originally, yes, a while ago, way back to 1976.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. "The summit was informed," again, I have here, "The summit was informed of the Lebanon Government's decision to put an end to the mission of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon." If Lebanon wants the Syrians out, will that be enough in your judgment? Also, you talked about the conference that said that they should end——

Secretary SHULTZ. I think when that says the conference, it means the Arab League summit meeting. They refer to it as the Conference. I believe that is the terminology involved.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So what you have goes beyond this, and perhaps——

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think this is the text. It is labeled "Text" of what was released, and that is what I am reading from.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Secretary, the Israelis, as you note in your prepared testimony, take exception to the idea that these items were within the scope of Camp David. The inclusion of economic, commercial, social, and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan, I suppose that is not as big a point. They say that was not mentioned in the Camp David Accords. Participation of Palestinian inhabitants and voting for West Bank authority—that is not mentioned. And the definition of full autonomy of Palestinian inhabitants, real authority over themselves, and the land and its resources, subject to fair safeguards of water. I believe the Israelis' approach to that has

been that autonomy was talked about with respect to inhabitants, and that was the purpose, and those were the precise discussions in the progressive responsibility for internal security.

Does that go beyond police forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, that is in the Camp David Accords.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The words "internal security?"

Ambassador FAIRBANKS. Senator, the Camp David language is, of course, a strong local police force, and the President's speech is not intended to go beyond that language. The concept is a strong local police force as it becomes more confident has a relationship which in the Camp David Accords calls for an agreement on internal security, and as that local police force gets stronger and more confident, obviously, the agreement can come into effect, so that they share some responsibility for internal security.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz, would you yield for just a second?

Secretary Shultz, we have two Senators that have not asked questions yet. Could you tell me at what time you must depart?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I ought to be leaving in about 10 minutes or so, if I could. I have an appointment back at the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. That would give only 5 minutes to the Senators.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will talk to Ambassador Fairbanks about these other points, and I noted the mention of Mr. Dam. I hope that we consider those nominees soon and quickly before the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. We will certainly do that. The committee is scheduled to do that next week. We hope to clear it from the floor before the recess.

Secretary SHULTZ. Obviously, different people interpret Camp David in different ways, and Mr. Begin is an authority on Camp David, no doubt about it. So is President Carter. He was there, too. And he said after the President's speech, on which he was thoroughly briefed, and he also saw the talking points that were used in talking and describing the President's position in Israel, and he said, "There is absolutely nothing in the President's speech nor in the information he sent to the Israelis which is contrary to either the letter or the spirit of Camp David, and it is absolutely compatible with the Camp David agreement."

So, I am not saying anybody is right or wrong, but we think the proposals are squarely in the Camp David framework. That has been our effort.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. There was one other item sent to the Israelis other than the talking points, and we talked about that yesterday, and the letter. I hope to still have a chance to see that. I presume President Carter saw that.

Secretary SHULTZ. No; what was communicated officially was, of course, the President's speech, but that came after the initial consultation, and the ambassador who made the presentation in each government had a letter from the President to the head of state basically saying that the ambassador is here representing me, and I fully stand behind what the ambassador is saying; he is speaking for me. So, they tried to give it a Presidential imprimatur.

And then the talking points that each ambassador had were basically the same, and that was deliberately done that way so that we would

be sure that we told the same story everywhere, not one thing here and another thing there. That is the process.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz, very much.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I will be brief and not take 10 minutes, in order for you to be able to make your rounds, and some of what I have to ask may have already been asked anyway. If it has, please just note it, and I will check the record.

Without my commenting on the substance of the President's plan, I was a bit surprised at both the timing and the apparent means of delivery of the plan. I would like to pursue that if I may for a moment, and it may have already been pursued. The Israeli complain that the major Arab countries were briefed in advance on the plan, and that they were not consulted. Would you comment on that for me?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir. I believe that everybody was consulted heavily. The Israelis we listened to. Of course, they had been in the negotiations for a long period of time, so their positions are well known. And in recent times, as various ministers have come here I have asked them for their views.

We have also, of course, consulted in our own country with you and with many other people. So there has been a very heavy process of consultation, including with official representatives of the governments involved.

When it came to the specific positions the President decided to take, of course, it has been noted they are not different from positions that have been taken in past time, particularly in private. We did have the advice from a great many people that a key to this whole thing is a process, a process that brings Jordan, if possible, into these negotiations.

So we went first to Jordan to see if we had a starter and King Hussein did tell us that he regarded the President's proposals as serious and he would study them carefully. So we did have that prior consultation. It was for the purpose of making the process go in a manner that practically everybody said you should have it go in.

Beyond that, the process of going to the governments was more or less simultaneous. The President's speech came on very quickly after that, more quickly than we had planned. We wanted to have more of a period of time for discussion, but the problem is that leaks come out so fast the President had to put his own case forward in his own way.

Senator BIDEN. I understand. I do not disagree with that. I think once the original decision was made, then it made sense to go to Jordan for the reasons you have stated and are implicit in your statement. Then I think the rest made sense.

As you know from our brief discussion, although I did not know you were about to go to Jordan when you asked our opinion, I feel very strongly that there is a sense of seige on the part of the present Prime Minister of Israel and from my few encounters with him, which have not been all that successful, I have concluded—and obviously I am not running the show—that what he needs to be is hugged and embraced rather than treated like the rest of the gang.

Otherwise, he reacts in ways that are not helpful, in my opinion, to his country—but that is his judgment and it is presumptuous of me

to make that—but clearly not in the interest of our country, because I think our country's interests lie in a very strong Israel—pure, naked self-interest of the United States.

What I worry about—and I have communicated this privately, but now that we are talking I shall say it publicly—but I am fearful that we are on a collision course with a gentleman who has shown in the past that he may very well say things and initiate things from which he will not retreat, then lock himself in; even though it may not be good in the long term, it is good short-term, domestic—apparently domestic—politics for him.

I think it reflects his emotional feeling about the subject. Our interest, in my opinion, starts from Israel and moves from there, but that is maybe a different point of view.

All I am saying is that I am really worried that we are going to have actions that engender a justifiable anger, disdain, resentment on the part of the U.S. Government, and the American people. I think that the Prime Minister's reaction, although I believe predictable in light of his past record, did great damage to United States-Israel relations. I am not as concerned about the relations as I am concerned about the United States, and that damage done, I think, impacts negatively on U.S. security interests.

I do not think most people think about Israel in this country as I suspect you and many members of the State Department do and I clearly do, and that is beyond the moral commitment that is a great strategic value in Israel, and I do not think people think of it in that way in this country.

They think of it in terms of our having an obligation to Israel and when Israel acts in ways that are not viewed by the world or by this country as magnanimous—and I clearly sense that sending the bulldozers is not what you call a magnanimous gesture on the part of the Prime Minister—I think it erodes American support and this is troublesome enough to Israel, but in the long run it is extremely troublesome for us, in my opinion, because we need Israel, in my opinion.

One question that I have, and then I will stop——

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with your identification of Israel as an important strategic ally of the United States. We have consulted. We have said and feel, and the President feels, very strongly about the importance of the security of Israel. That is all through his speech.

There is a special paragraph put in additionally right at the last minute by the President, and so we are not disagreeing on that at all.

Senator BIDEN. I know that.

Secretary SHULTZ. The point is I do not think we should get ourselves into a position where we will never be willing to take a position that is different from the position of the Government of Israel. We are a country too. We have to take our own positions.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with that completely. The only thing I am saying as that I think that events in history are oftentimes as much impacted upon by the idiosyncracies and personalities of the people in power at the moment.

The fact of the matter is Menachem Begin is there. Every indication, every poll, everything we see short term—next 6 months to a year, God willing, Menachim Begin's health holding up—he is going

to be there. He has gotten stronger, not weaker domestically. And I think that is a political fact of life.

If we know that a reaction, that the way in which we present something, is going to impact upon the actions of the person who is in fact in charge there, like it or not, which will have a detrimental effect, I think that is not looking out for our interest. I think that is in fact looking out for our interests.

And I am not suggesting that we should not take a different point of view. Let us assume for the sake of discussion—just to make my position clear on this—that we decided tomorrow that we were going to take a position radically different than Camp David. We did not, but let us assume we did.

We have the right to do that as a country and the President of the United States has a right to do that if he wishes to. All I am suggesting is that before he goes to speak to the other party, he pick up the phone and/or send his emissaries to Menachem Begin and say, "Menachem, I have news for you. Times are changing. This is what we are going to do tomorrow. We are leaving here and going across the Jordan River to speak to Hussein."

I do not think that is taking—being hostile to Israel. I think that is responding to what is a realistic situation, assessment of the situation.

But my substantive question is this. In our discussions with King Hussein, have we made any further commitments with regard to arms sales to Jordan in return for consideration of this package? Is that being contemplated now?

Secretary SHULTZ. Our discussions with King Hussein concentrated on the matters under review and that we have discussed here. The question of arms has come up from time to time in our relationships with Jordan. I am aware of that.

Personally, I think if King Hussein were part of the peace process the question of our arms sales to Jordan would be looked on much more favorably and easier than they are at the present time.

Senator BIDEN. I would think they would be. I also think we should continue to look on the opposite side of that. As long as he is not part of the peace process, I think it should be looked on unfavorably.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I am sorry to say that there are disputes in that area other than the Arab-Israeli dispute, and we have to be aware of them.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with you. I understand that. I still reach the same conclusion, though. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for being late. I was chairing an Aging Committee hearing in part this morning.

I just have one question because I know you must go. I would appreciate knowing your thoughts on the relationship of the demilitarized zone to the occupied territories as well as U.N. Resolution 242. Now in the President's speech he said that he did not want to ask the bulk of Israel's population to live again within range of Arab artillery. I think you said that that did not mean that the United States envisaged that Israel should necessarily retain a wide strip of the territory seized in the 1967 Middle East War.

But exactly what did the President mean in relationship to the provision that Arab guns would have to be at least 10 or 15 miles away? Is that a change in policy regarding the occupied territories?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir; I do not believe so. I think the President was pointing out something that anyone who looks at the map can know—that Israel is a very small piece of geography and there is in the 1967 borders a place where the distance between the border and the sea is, I think, approximately 10 miles.

So there is a certain vulnerability that goes with geographic size. The President recognized that. Now, how do you cure that? Well, in the process of negotiating the so-called final status, persumably one of the things that will be negotiated are boundaries and conditions that lead to security. That is point one.

Point two, it would seem to me likely that—and certainly our position would be that—that area should be demilitarized in the sense of not containing forces that are capable of launching an offense. Third, obviously the end point of the whole process should be one that results in a peaceful situation where people have decided they are going to live together rather than fight with each other.

So all of those things contribute. But I think while the last is in some ways, many ways, the most important and the most fundamental, at the same time I think we all feel that we would like to see strong, firm security arrangements that we have some control over, and the President expressed his support for that viewpoint.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to just ask if you could add for the record for us, or at some future time, the answer to one question?

Taking from the section that you have on page 7, you say that you will not support the formation of a Palestinian state in these negotiations. There is no foundation for political support in Israel or in the United States for such a solution.

I would like to add there is no basis and foundation of support in this committee for that concept and I do not think there is a great deal of support in the Arab world. I think really the Palestinians have to be very realistic about this. In talking with a lot of Palestinians, West Bank mayors, and so forth, they feel some federation with Jordan—something in their lifetime—is far better than this concept of a sovereign state. Such a state free to make its own independent policy, which would be, I think, a concern to the Arab States.

I have never supported such a concept. I was pleased that the President singled that out. The key to a solution of the Palestinian problem is some form of association with Jordan. We have not had time to explore what kind of associations. It would be helpful to us if we could have an expansion on that concept. What do we visualize?

I want to thank you very much for your appearance. It has been extraordinarily helpful.

The committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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